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Contribution Among Negligent Joint
Tortfeasors In Illinois: A
Squeamish Damsel
Comes of Age
Michael J. Polelle*
A perennial bane in the ordered growth of law is the misuse of two
related but distinct principles with resultant detriment to both. Such
is the fate of contribution and indemnity actions in Illinois negligence
law. Although said on good judicial authority to seem a "squeamish
damsel", contribution at one time led a robust courtship with negli-
gent joint tortfeasors in Illinois.' If contribution now seems squeam-
ish, it is simply that our jurisprudence has disowned contribution and
so indulged active-passive indemnity that indemnity has now become
an "impudent damsel". The time has come to reconsider why these
two damsels have caused disturbance in the household of the law.
This article will seek to establish the following three propositions:
(1) that Illinois case precedent does not categorically prohibit contri-
bution between negligent joint tortfeasors; (2) that the failure to recog-
nize contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors in Illinois has
prompted judges to expand the active-passive indemnity doctrine into
an unsatisfactory substitute for such contribution; and (3) that a
judicial re-affirmation of contribution between negligent joint tort-
feasors, in situations where indemnity is not the appropriate remedy, is
necessary if logic and reason are to prevail over the current confused
state of the law. In the context of this discussion, the term "contribu-
tion" means that where joint tortfeasors are each guilty of personal
fault, each bears shared and proportionate liability for the total damage.
"Indemnity", on the other hand, may be defined as the shifting of the
total damage from a technical joint tortfeasor who is without personal
fault to the actually negligent joint tortfeasor who is personally at
* Mr. Polelle is an Assistant Professor of Law at DePaul University College of
Law in Chicago.
1. Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 IlM. App. 2d 534, 538, 165 N.E.2d 346,
349, (1960).
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fault.2 Although separate and distinct principles designed for differ-
ent situations, both serve the same fundamental tort policy of relating
liability to fault.
I
A historical study of case law does not support the supposedly well-
settled proposition that contribution is prohibited between negligent
joint tortfeasors in Illinois.3 The law is considered well-settled largely
because it has become an unquestioned shibboleth. The original rule
against contribution was first enunciated in the case of Merryweather
v. Nixan4 , which arose as a result of a prior judgment entered against
two converters who had acted in concert to perpetrate a conversion of
property. One converter, having paid the entire judgment, was not
allowed to obtain a one-half share of the payment from his fellow con-
verter. On its very facts the Merryweather decision has nothing to do
with negligence. The intentional tort of conspiratorial conversion in
that case is clearly distinguishable from independent acts of concurrent
negligence. Although the case broadly refers in passing to "joint
wrong-doers", the common law of that time restricted the application of
joint torts to persons who acted in concert and in pursuance of a com-
mon design. 5
Nelson v. Cook6 explicitly incorporated the Merryweather decision
into Illinois law. The Nelson court said that a right of indemnity would
exist in favor of an auctioneer or warehouseman who in good faith sold
or delivered goods at the direction of the owner. The court also rea-
soned that a sheriff ordinarily has a similar right of indemnity against
one who improperly directs him to levy on goods owned by another,
where the act of the sheriff is not an apparent wrong or where title is
in doubt. Although the sheriff in the actual case was denied recovery
on other grounds, the court stated it would bar indemnity only where
an agent knowingly commits a crime, trespass, or apparent wrong.
It is unclear whether the court meant to distinguish the Merryweather
decision on the basis that the English case involved contribution and not
indemnity, or whether the court viewed its theory of known and ap-
parent wrong as an exception to an expanded Merryweather doctrine
2. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96, 102 (1936). Comment a of § 102
says the no contribution rule is explainable only on historical grounds.
3. "It is generally recognized that in Illinois there is no contribution betweenjoint tortfeasors, but under proper circumstances indemnity will be granted." Kissel,
Our Puzzling Third Party Practice, 42 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 63, 64 (1960).
4. 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 133 (K.B. 1799).
5. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 43 (3rd ed. 1964).
6. 17 Ill. 443 (1856).
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which embraced indemnity as well as contribution. 7  This early un-
certainty set the groundwork for the future confusion of both remedies
in Illinois.
A decade later, contribution received specific approbation in Selz v.
Unna.' The plaintiff in Selz agreed not to execute against two joint
defendants. The plaintiff having nevertheless assigned judgment to a
bona fide purchaser, that purchaser tried to execute against the two
defendants on the basis of their proportionate share of the total liability.
In allowing such execution the United States Supreme Court reasoned
that where liability is joint, equal contribution between wrong-doers is
just and equitable, even were the assignment designed as a subterfuge
to avoid the plaintiff's agreement. Later, the case of Goldsborough
v. Darst went so far as to explicitly allow contribution between joint
tortfeasors who were liable for an intentional fraud toward the plain-
tiff. The court, even at that early date, felt that the rule against con-
tribution was so riddled with exceptions as to be no longer a general rule.
This is the only Illinois case found which openly approves of allowing
contribution between intentional joint tortfeasors. 1°
The succeeding case of Farwell v. Becker" is strong and direct au-
thority for the proposition that contribution may be had between negli-
gent joint tortfeasors. In that case creditors sued out an attachment
against their debtor's goods, which they thought were sold to defraud
them, although the purchaser of the goods insisted on his ownership to
the creditors. The appellate court concluded that, although the Merry-
weather prohibition was confined to joint tortfeasors who knew or
must be presumed to have known that they were committing a tortious
act, the creditors in the case presumptively knew that they were com-
mitting a tort due to the purchaser's possession of the goods and his
claim of ownership. Therefore, no contribution was allowed. In re-
versing the appellate decision by allowing contribution, the Illinois Su-
preme Court, speaking through Justice Craig, agreed with the lower
court in two respects: (1) that the weight of authority did not sustain
the broad statement in Merryweather depriving all joint tortfeasors of
7. The Merryweather case was explicit in stating that its decision "would not affect
cases of indemnity." Supra note 4, at 186.
8. 21 F. Cas. 1051 (No. 12, 650) (C.C.N.D. fli. 1866), afj'd, 73 U.S. 327 (1867).
9. 9 Ill. App. 205 (1881).
10. Contra, Rend v. Chicago West Division Ry., 8 Ill. App. 517 (1881) which
speaks of not allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors. Although the case ac-
tually involved an indemnity action, the jury in effect awarded contribution. Johnson
v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 105 111. 462 (1882), aff'd, 119 U.S. 388 (1886), also
refers broadly to no contribution among joint tortfeasors but this is incidental to the
case and devoid of analysis.
11. 25 Ill. App. 432 (1887), rev'd, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889).
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contribution, and (2) that the proper test was whether the joint tort-
feasors knew or must be presumed to have known that they were com-
mitting a tort. The court noted that England itself had departed from
the strict Merryweather prohibition by allowing contribution where the
parties honestly believed they were doing a legal act, and denying con-
tribution only where the tortfeasors were conscious of wrongdoing. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed because it did not believe the
creditors were barred by the application of this test. Justice Craig
asked:
Were not the facts surrounding the transaction such that a reason-
ably prudent person might well believe that an attempt had been
made to defraud creditors? If so, it can not be said that the at-
taching creditors, in making the levy, intentionally violated the law.
Nor were they presumed to have known the levy was unlawful.13
(Emphasis added.)
The reference in Farwell to a "reasonably prudent person" seems at
first sight to prohibit contribution among negligent as well as intentional
joint tortfeasors. However, this first impression yields to the observa-
tion that the court speaks of intentional wrongdoing within the same
context and relegates reasonable prudence to a type of circumstantial
evidence which merely negates any inference or presumption of intent.
The appellate court, on the other hand, had inferred or presumed just
such an intent from the circumstances. But both courts agreed that in-
tent or knowledge is the ultimate test. Where a man acts so unrea-
sonably that a result is substantially certain to follow, courts naturally
deal with this as a case of presumed intent.'4 Had the Illinois Supreme
Court really meant to bar negligent joint tortfeasors as well, it cer-
tainly would not have allowed contribution where the parties honestly
but erroneously thought they were doing a legal or proper act. Such a
state of honest but erroneous inadvertence, falling below the standard
of due care, occurs frequently in negligence cases. Finally, the Farwell
decision purposely and explicitly limits the Merryweather doctrine as
broadly interpreted by a minority of courts. This limitation would
have been contradictory if the Illinois Supreme Court had really in-
tended to bar any and all joint tortfeasors from contribution. It is un-
reasonable to assume that the Farwell court, which refused to bar con-
tribution on the basis of the narrowly technical intention of concerted
conversion which sufficed in Merryweather, would not allow contribu-
12. The English law now allows contribution between all joint tortfeasors by
statute. Law Reform Act, 25 and 26 GEo. 5, Ch. 30 (1935).
13. 129 Ill. at 273, 21 N.E. at 793.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 8.
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tion between negligent concurring tortfeasors acting independently with-
out any intent. The conclusion must be that Farwell allowed isolated
strands of care or lack thereof to be used only as circumstantial evidence
of intent rather than a disjunctive cause of action sounding in negli-
gence. 15
Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guthman' followed the reasoning of Farwell
and Nelson by holding that a sheriff who in good faith levied on wrong
property was entitled to indemnity from the directing creditors, who in
turn could obtain contribution from one another due to the damage of
the wrongful seizure. The only requirement set by the court was that
the creditors sue out an execution in good faith, with no intention of
committing trespass or injuring anyone, and in the honest belief that
attachment could be maintained. Although prudence was required,
this again seems to be a circumstantial admonition bearing only on the
degree of good faith and lack of intention.
The next fully reasoned decision regarding the matter is the Illinois
Supreme Court case of Wanack v. Michels.17  There the court refused
contribution to a saloonkeeper's co-surety, who, having paid the plain-
tiff under the Dram Shop Act, sought contribution from the owner
of the premises for the owner's share of the liability. The decision
itself is easily enough explained by the strong public policy thought to
inhere in the Dram Shop Act. More significant, however, is the tribu-
nal's categorical ruling that the prohibition of contribution is restricted
to intentional wrong-doers. The court circumstantially decided that an
owner who leases to a saloonkeeper, with knowledge that liquor would
be sold on the premises, cannot be said to have acted unintentionally.
Though one might conceivably differ as to the finding of intent, the
court in any case found itself compelled to determine intent before
implementing the rule prohibiting contribution. Had negligence been
sufficient, the court would not have felt the clear necessity of grounding
its decision on a finding of specific intent.'8
15. Vieths v. Skinner, 47 Ill. App. 325 (1892), stated that as between the negligent
tortfeasors in that case judgment and execution might be taken only against one be-
cause of the non-contribution rule among wrong-doers. This overly broad statement of
the no-contribution rule is actually irrelevant to the holding that joint tortfeasors may
be severally liable.
16. 62 Ill. App. 624 (1895).
17. 215 Ill. 87 (1905).
18. Consolidated Fire-Works v. Koehl, 92 Ill. App. 8 (1900), is similar to the
Vieths case, supra note 15, inasmuch as the case really declared the joint and several
liability of tortfeasors. The court only incidentally noted that because contribution
did not exist between tortfeasors, a liable defendant could not complain that another
might also have been held liable. But who has a better right to complain? The more
joint the tortfeasors are, the greater the inequity to the tortfeasor who pays all.
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Chicago Railways Co. v. Conway19 made it clear that the reasoning
of the Farwell and Wanack decisions was still viable in Illinois. In that
case Chicago Railways, a streetcar company, successfully sought in-
demnity from a negligent paving contractor whom Chicago Railways
had engaged to perform certain roadway repair. In the course of its
repair the contractor removed a portion of the pavement. The plain-
tiff, a motorcycle policeman, was injured when he drove into the exca-
vation at night. The plaintiff sued both Chicago Railways and the
paving company for negligence and recovered against both. The sole
basis for the liability of Chicago Railways was a city ordinance which
required that every person digging in streets erect a fence and main-
tain lighting. The court declared in the course of its opinion:
It is a general and long-established rule of law that neither contri-
bution nor indemnity will be given to one of several joint tortfeasors
against the others. The rule is only applied to cases of intentional
or conscious wrongdoing. 20
The court's decision is particularly significant in that Chicago Rail-
ways followed the lead of Nelson by explicitly broadening the no-con-
tribution rule beyond Merryweather to include indemnity as well as
contribution, and then limited the prohibition to intentional wrongs in
compliance with Farwell. Thus broadened and thus limited, the rule
was subjected to a novel exception in cases of indemnity: the active-
passive doctrine. The court concluded that since no moral turpitude
but only malum prohibitum was involved, it could permissibly examine
the relative delinquency of the parties. Upon examination the court
found that Chicago Railways was only technically liable for a statutory
violation, whereas the contractor was the "primary cause" of liability.
The court, consistent with the basic purpose of indemnity, required
something more than a showing that both defendants acted unintention-
ally. The court correctly felt obliged to indicate what this further show-
ing should contain in order to shift the entire burden of liability to
another. Unlike Nelson, this court did not view mere lack of inten-
tion as sufficient to establish the right of indemnity.
But the important point is that Chicago Railways laid down an ad-
ditional requirement only for those seeking indemnity. Nothing in the
case remotely suggests that the primary-technical distinction is relevant
to those seeking only contribution. It would indeed be fallacious to
assume that as a result of Chicago Railways no remedy other than pri-
mary-technical indemnity existed for joint tortfeasors. On the con-
19. 219 IMl. App. 220 (1920).
20. Id. at 223.
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trary, the reasoning of Chicago Railways implied that contribution
might still be had between unintentional joint tortfeasors who seek
contribution. If, for example, Chicago Railways had sought only con-
tribution and not indemnity, the court clearly would have had no need
to devise the primary-technical distinction. Especially since the earlier
cases were left undisturbed, the recognition of indemnity on a primary-
technical theory in no way necessitated the demise of contribution be-
tween negligent joint tortfeasors.2 1
Thus far, the formative law of Illinois, particularly as revealed
through the Illinois Supreme Court, allowed contribution between un-
intentional, including negligent, joint tortfeasors. Although some of
the early appellate cases seem to prohibit contribution between all
joint tortfeasors, their remarks are really only broadly phrased propo-
sitions collateral to main issues and containing either sparse reasoning
or none at all. The real test for contribution should depend only on
the mental state involved: Did the joint tortfeasors act intentionally or
did they not? The test has nothing to do with the causative or quanti-
tative characterization of their acts as active or passive, primary or
technical. As late as 1931, the case of Skala v. Lehon,22 in the course
of holding that master and servant could be joined in one suit, stated
that although the right of contribution does not exist between joint
tortfeasors acting in concert, it does exist where no concerted action
exists. The landmark case of George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co.23,
which permitted contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors in the
District of Columbia, cited the Skala decision as authority for the view
that contribution is only denied to intentional joint tortfeasors. Ironi-
cally, this out-of-state court has seen in Illinois that very right to con-
tribution which contemporary Illinois courts have refused to acknowl-
edge.
II
The year 1923 marked the real eclipse of contribution by the rise of
the active-passive doctrine. In that year Griffiths v. National Fire-
21. Steinhaus v. Radtke, 145 Ill. App. 232 (1908), held that suit, judgment, and
execution m'ght properly be brought against only one of two intentional joint tort-
feasors. Aside from reasonless dictum that no contribution exists among joint tort-
feasors, the actual decision did not deal with negligent tortfeasors. Vandalia R.R. v.
Nordhaus, 161 Ill. App. 110 (1911), also states broadly that no contribution exists
among joint tortfeasors, although the real holding is that a joint tortfeasor knowing of a
covenant not to sue in favor of a co-defendant, prior to a motion for a new trial, is not
prejudiced by the covenant.
22. 343 I11. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931).
23. 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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proofing Co."4 was decided under the Illinois Scaffold Act. A sub-
contractor had agreed to install certain fireproofing for the general
contractor and to use due diligence in performing the contract. The
plaintiff, injured by tile falling from the scaffold, sued the general con-
tractor, who in turn sought indemnity from the subcontractor. Un-
willing to rest its decision solely on the express contractual provision of
due care, the court decided that since no moral turpitude was involved
the general contractor was entitled to indemnity. In so deciding the
court said:
The general rule is that where two parties acting together commit
an illegal or wrongful act the party injured may hold both respon-
sible for the damages resulting from their joint act and neither can
recover from the other the damages he may have paid or any part
of them. The further general principle is announced, however, in
many cases, that where one does the act which produces the injury
and the other does not join the act but is thereby exposed to lia-
bility and suffers damage the latter may recover against the prin-
cipal delinquent, and the law will inquire into the real delinquency
and place the ultimate liability upon him whose fault was the pri-
mary cause of the injury.2 5
This doctrinal statement omits that prior line of decisions which es-
tablished contribution as a legal remedy for negligent joint tortfeasors.
Unlike Chicago Railways, the Griliths court seemed to assume that
there was no contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors except
to the extent that the active-passive doctrine or an express indemnity
provision permitted otherwise. But this negative inference from omis-
sion, even if true, should not be viewed as overruling prior cases dealing
with contribution, especially since the Griffiths court was concerned
solely with indemnity sought under the terms of an express contract.
In fact, the active-passive discussion in that case was merely an al-
ternate holding.
Not until twenty-three years later in Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v.
Arthur Dixon Transfer Co. 26 was the active-passive doctrine again in-
voked. A defendant railroad, having paid its employee under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, was allowed indemnity against a co-
defendant trucking company which had contracted to do certain truck-
ing for the railroad. The railroad contended that the trucker had
breached an implied indemnity of due care in the contract when the
plaintiff was crushed between a boxcar and one of the co-defendant's
24. 310 IlM. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923).
25. Id at 339, 141 N.E. at 742.
26. 343 1H1. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
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trucks. The trial court struck the railroad's indemnity complaint on
the ground that the railroad was a tortfeasor seeking "contribution"
and, therefore, could not recover on its theory of implied indemnity.
In reversing, the appellate court said that there were "many exceptions
to the general principle of non-contribution between tortfeasors. '"27
The court proceeded to list five categories of exception, all of which
involved the active-passive doctrine of indemnity and none of which in-
volved true contribution. The appellate court then granted indemnity
to the railroad on the theory that negligence was not a form of moral
turpitude which automatically barred indemnity. The court thus felt
free to find the real delinquent in the case by use of the active-passive
doctrine; but, in so deciding, neglected to define activity or passivity.
The court did state that physical motion, or the lack of it, was not the
proper criteria. Unfortunately, saying what the doctrine was not failed
to reveal what it was.
The significance of the Arthur Dixon decision lies not only in its con-
fusion of contribution with indemnity but in its assumption that in-
demnity situations alone are an exception to a general prohibition of
recovery between joint tortfeasors. The Griffiths-Arthur Dixon analy-
sis ignored earlier cases dealing with contribution for the probable
reason that neither case was required to consider contribution. How-
ever, unlike the Chicago Railways statement of the doctrine, this analy-
sis inadvertently left open the negative inference that no contributive
remedy existed between joint tortfeasors except indemnity. Thus, in-
demnity became misconstrued as a form of contribution. This coales-
cence of distinct principles was probably abetted by the deceptive simi-
larity between the moral turpitude-malum prohibitum distinction of
the indemnity cases and the intentional-unintentional distinction of the
contribution cases. The other major defect of the Griffiths-Arthur
Dixon analysis was that it set no explicit limits to the active-passive doc-
trine. Although both cases involved contractual and statutory rela-
tionships on their facts, the Arthur Dixon case drew no such limitation
in its list of five categories where active-passive indemnity was allow-
able. The truth of the matter is that Illinois courts have increasingly
made the active-passive doctrine a separate basis for indemnity relief,
irrespective of any prior existing legal relationship between the tort-
feasors. The result in our day has been rank confusion.
The following cases reveal the confusing inconsistency which ob-
tains when the active-passive doctrine is treated as a separate basis of
27. Id. at 152, 98 N.E.2d at 785.
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indemnity. In Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,2 8 indemnity
was allowed to the owner of a vehicle illegally parked near a crosswalk
against a co-defendant who, because of this obstruction to his view,
struck the plaintiff. On the other hand, in Drell v. American National
Bank & Trust Co.,29 a plumbing firm which had left an empty oxygen
tank on a common walk was denied indemnity against a co-defendant
who tied a dog to the abandoned tank, although the dog injured the
plaintiff by toppling the tank. Then in Stewart v. Mister Softee of
Illinois, Inc.,0 the owner of a doubleparked ice cream truck was not
allowed indemnity against the co-defendant whose vehicle injured the
child plaintiff. The court held the doubleparking and sounding of
chimes to constitute "active negligence" which barred indemnity. No
sooner had the pre-Reynolds' era returned when it was hastily aban-
doned once again in Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc.81
In Sargent, a defendant who parked his vehicle at a crosswalk was
allowed to file an indemnity counterclaim against a co-defendant whose
vehicle actually injured the child plaintiff. The indemnitee success-
fully relied on Reynolds in reversing the adverse decision below. The
appellee unsuccessfully urged that following Reynolds would unfairly
shift the entire liability from one negligent joint tortfeasor to another.
In reversing the dismissal of the counterclaim, the court ruled that
active-passive indemnity should not depend upon some pre-accident
relationship or community of interest between negligent tortfeasors.
The court conceded that total indemnity would appear unjust if the
evidence should disclose that the appellant, though in some measure to
blame for the accident, was allowed to shift his entire liability under the
active-passive doctrine. However, the court concluded that this in-
equity was unavoidable until the dubious no-contribution rule was
abolished. Although apparently unwilling to attack the no-contribution
rule head-on, the court did not find it disturbing that the Reynolds de-
cision might lead to contribution. Concerning the no-contribution doc-
trine, the court said:
The Illinois judiciary is keenly aware of the inequities flowing from
the present rule, and the perplexities which have arisen from the
indemnity exception, and has recommended the rule's abolition.
The Illinois Judicial Conference of 1964 unanimously adopted a res-
olution favoring contribution between joint tortfeasors. The legis-
lature has not acted upon the conference recommendation and the
28. 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964).
29. 57 Ill. App. 2d 129, 207 N.E.d 101 (1965).
30. 75 Ill. App. 2d 328, 221 N.E.2d 11 (1966).
31. 86 Ifl. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967).
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rule remains in force. However, the rule was court-made and can
be court-changed.3 2
It is unlikely that the Illinois judiciary can much longer avoid a con-
frontation with the resultant injustices of the no-contribution slogan.
The extension of the active-passive doctrine beyond its functional role
has led to decisions which seem to confuse contribution with the in-
demnity relief actually rendered or, worse yet, which proceed as though
indemnity and contribution were merely redundant words for the same
concept."3 Alongside this confusion is the new confusion of trying to
determine what constitutes "active" and "passive" conduct between
negligent joint tortfeasors who have had no prior legal relationships.
The active-passive doctrine has generated mass uncertainty among trial
practitioners and is responsible for an avalanche of questionable third-
party and counterclaim actions which do nothing but invoke the active-
passive jargon like some supposedly magical incantation whose mean-
ing has long been forgotten. Even the courts have, on occasion, con-
fessed that the active-passive doctrine is applied ad hoc and leads to
no uniformity in result.14
It is understandable why the active-passive doctrine, when shorn of
its historical and analytical roots, must generate confusion. The active-
passive test was designed to shift the entire burden of liability only in
those cases where the non-existent fault of a joint tortfeasor made
such a shift easy to justify. However, to apply this indemnity principle
to cases like Reynolds, Drell, Mister Softee, or Sargent will result either
in meaningless metaphysical manipulations of "activity" or "passivity",
for physical motion has no relevance, or else in an illusory weighing of
closely balanced fault when the result is always a preordained double-
or-nothing liability. In modern multiple-fault negligence situations, es-
pecially in the field of automobile law, the "principal delinquent" is
usually a mythological character. The more nearly equal the negli-
gence of joint tortfeasors, the more capricious the result produced by
an unrealistic weighing of imponderables. The archetype of the ac-
tive-passive doctrine presupposes the ideal of no fault in the indemni-
tee; the principle of contribution, however, is most fittingly employed
where all joint tortfeasors are tainted by the tar of personal fault. Shar-
32. Id. at 197, 229 N.E.2d at 774.
33. Boston v. Old Orchard Business District, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 324, 168 N.E.2d
52 (1960); Holcomb v. Flavin, 37 Il1. App. 2d 359, 185 N.E.2d 716 (1962); Embree
v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49 I11. App. 2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964); Rovekamp v. Central
Const. Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 756 (1964).
34. Topel v. Porter, 95 Ill. App. 2d 315, 237 N.E.2d 711 (1968); Gillette v. Todd,
245 N.E.2d 923 (1969).
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ing of liability and not the shifting thereof is the only satisfactory
remedy in such cases. Contributive damage is the logical corollary to
almost equally contributive causes8 5
However, the most severe inadequacy of the process which makes
active-passive indemnity serve in lieu of contribution appears in the
common situation of two joint tortfeasors with no prior relationship,
who, being found mutually active or mutually passive, are not allowed
either to share or to shift liability. The active-passive doctrine comes
into play only if the indemnitor is found "active" and the indemnitee
"passive". Even if one assumes this to be a realistic task in the ab-
sence of a prior legal relationship, there seems to be no sound policy
reason for a "passive" negligent tortfeasor to be completely exonerated
when his counterpart is "active", yet left completely remediless when
the counterpart is also "passive". The harshness of refusing a remedy
in this type of case is heightened by the realization that even so-called
"active" or "passive" tortfeasors bear traces of the opposite brand of
negligence in their conduct. The law recognizes no partly active, partly
passive joint tortfeasor who seeks indemnity. Why should so much turn
on the fortuitous characterization of a co-defendant under the active-
passive crystal ball test? A return to the intentional-unintentional test
of contribution would assure that all indemnitees having the same men-
tal state would be treated alike. The invidious distinctions made be-
tween tortfeasors based not only on their activity or passivity but also
on that of their co-defendant would cease to exist.
Moreover, McDonald v. Trampf86 illustrates the basic incongruity
between the active-passive test of indemnity and the earlier intentional-
unintentional test of contribution. There the court, in a careful analysis
of prior Illinois law, conceded that contribution is only prohibited to
intentional tortfeasors acting in concert. But it further concluded that
once a negligent joint tortfeasor escapes that prohibition he must still
meet the second hurdle of the active-passive test to obtain relief. Yet
it is paradoxical to employ an active-passive indemnity test in a situa-
tion calling for contribution alone. Indeed, to employ both tests is self-
defeating since one can often act unintentionally for contribution pur-
poses and yet be actively negligent for indemnity purposes. The pro-
posal of McDonald is superfluous for indemnity purposes and unduly
35. Illinois courts have recognized that the active-passive test was designed for
situations where there was no personal fault of the indemnitee to weigh: Palmer
House Co. v. Otto, 347 Ill. App. 198, 106 N.E.2d 753 (1952); Sleck v. Butler Bros.,
53 Ill. App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64 (1964).
36. 49 IlM. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E.2d 537 (1964).
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stringent for contribution purposes. The court, sensing the vital case
law of contribution, tried valiantly to combine two tests into one. But
they cannot be combined because their purposes and policies are dif-
ferent. The attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable only reveals the
needless restrictions clamped upon legal development by a loosely ap-
plied active-passive test.
The Illinois Supreme Court has indicated, cautiously in Miller v.
DeWitt, 7 and more explicitly in Muhlbauer v. Kruzel,88 that the ac-
tive-passive doctrine should be restricted to situations in which some
prior relationship between the parties existed upon which a duty to in-
demnify might be predicated. Most of these prior relationships will
likely arise in the traditional indemnity areas of contractural, statutory,
or principal-agent relationships. One may have such a relationship and
yet run afoul of the active-passive test which presupposes the relation-
ship. Where the modem maze of statutory and contractual law bases
liability on factors divorced from personal fault, 9 it is entirely consist-
ent with the fault principle to hold that a defendant only legally liable
should be indemnified for the actual and personal fault of a co-defend-
ant. Restricted to a prior relationship situation where the potential in-
demnitee is not involved in the actual commission of the tort, the active-
passive test can be applied consistently and justly.
However, the constantly reoccuring danger in present Illinois law is
the temptation to extend the active-passive doctrine to non-contractual
and non-statutory negligence cases where contribution is the natural
remedy. As long as contribution is not recognized between negligent
joint tortfeasors, Illinois judges will be understandably enticed into fill-
ing the void by stretching the active-passive doctrine until it unques-
tionably emerges as a separate basis for indemnity irrespective of any
prior relationship either in law or in fact. 40  In their attempt to rectify
inequity caused by the overstated no-contribution rule, judges have un-
fortunately spread the necessarily restricted active-passive parasite,
along with its host, the law of indemnity, into areas that neither was in-
tended to serve nor can serve without causing a corresponding in-
equity. These judges are trapped in the dilemma of trying to operate
with the clumsy remedy of indemnity. They need the scalpel of con-
37. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
38. 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
39. E.g., Scaffold Acts, Workmen's Compensation Acts, the Federal Employer's
Liability Act and certain non-delegable duties.
40. In Spivack v. Hara, 69 Ill. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d 173 (1963), the court indi-
cated that the active-passive doctrine was developed "[tlo combat the harshness of a
rule prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors in all cases." Supra at 24, 216 N.E.2d
at 174.
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tribution for their judicial surgery, but have only the improper butcher
knife of active-passive indemnity.41
The practical results of this dilemma can be seen in the following
three cases, each of which would be susceptible of the contributive
principle had contemporary Illinois law not emasculated that principle.
In Shapiro v. Gulf Mobile & Ohio Railroad,42 a railroad, charged with
ordinary negligence for the improper speed of its train, for failure to
maintain a lookout and for failure to use warning devices or to apply
brakes, argued that even if found to be an active tortfeasor, it should,
nevertheless, be allowed indemnity against a co-defendant motorist
charged with wilful and wanton negligence in stalling his auto on the
tracks, speeding, failing to keep a lookout, proceeding against signals
and deserting plaintiff's decedent on the tracks. The court found both
defendants to be active tortfeasors and denied indemnity since the re-
spective negligence of the two wrongdoers could not be measured for
the purpose of determining indemnity. The court may be inaccurate
in assuming that Illinois courts do not weigh comparative fault so as
to determine active-passive indemnity, but it is surely correct in its
instinctive feeling that indemnity is not the proper device for this situa-
tion. But rather than leaving this relatively appealing third-party
plaintiff without any remedy, contribution could have been used to
bypass the admittedly hopeless task of finding a technical tortfeasor.
Dobbins v. Beachler43 exhibits the sterility of the active-passive con-
cept in automobile litigation. There the defendant driver of the forward
vehicle stopped suddenly without signaling to the co-defendant, who
smashed his following vehicle into the forward vehicle. A passenger
in the first car obtained a verdict of $45,000 jointly against both
drivers. The insurer of the first driver paid its full policy limit of
$30,000 and brought a declaratory judgment action against the second
motorist and his insurer for a contributive share of the $30,000 paid.44
Predictably, the court held that since the first motorist was an "active"
tortfeasor he could not recover contribution of any sort. Unconcerned
that neither defendant was an intentional wrongdoer, the court applied
the inapplicable indemnity terminology of "active-passive" to a situa-
tion where contribution alone was sought. Under the active-passive
41. For example, Bohannon v. Industrial Maintenance, 16 Ill. App. 2d 402, 148
N.E.2d 602 (1958), seems to brand all corporations as "active" tortfeasors since they
can only "act" through agents.
42. 256 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1958).
43. 47 111. App. 2d 30, 197 N.E.2d 518 (1964) (ab.dec).
44. The contributive share sought being the amount paid in excess of the in-
sured's proportionate part of the judgment. Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, 222 1.
App. 56, 59 (1921); PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 46.
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standard neither driver in such a common situation is able to distribute
liability since both are "actively" negligent in having some personal
fault. Whether or not indemnity is applied in such a case, inequity
will result to one of the defendants. Contribution alone can balance
the scale of fault.
Finally, the decision of Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. v. Evans
Const. Co.' 5 further reveals the impotency of the active-passive test in
instances of negligence. In the course of that decision, the court as-
sumed that even if both third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant
had the same duty to inspect, the third-party plaintiff would still be un-
able to recover, since the duty to inspect rested equally on both. It is
precisely in this area of equal negligence that contribution is uniquely
capable of rendering justice. However, the court assumed, in the face
of earlier decisions, that contribution is not allowed in Illinois and that
for indemnity to succeed it is necessary to draw a "qualitative" distinc-
tion between the negligence of the joint tortfeasors. But the majority
of multiple-negligence cases, in the absence of strict liability imposed
by statute or otherwise, do not have "qualitative" differences.
I
In conclusion, the Illinois courts can and should reassert the languish-
ing principle of contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors. This
reassertion would not be an innovation but rather the return to a once
vital principle. Surely a judiciary which has forthrightly declared that
courts can undo what they have once done will find it no more difficult
a task to refurbish the principle of contribution on a case by case
basis. Not only has the Illinois judiciary undercut judge-made govern-
mental and charitable tort immunity rules, but it has also taken the
lead in expanding the principle of strict tort liability and in relating
strict liability to the needs of a modem, consumer-oriented society.46
Moreover, the same judiciary was able to study anew the basic theory
of contributory negligence.47
Although some will object that contribution is an unwieldy and
covert substitute for a rejected comparative negligence rule, it should
be remembered that the Illinois judiciary has not considered it inappro-
priate for an Illinois jury to apply the Wisconsin rule allowing contribu-
45. 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
46. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Iil. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 I1. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
47. Maki v. Frelk, 40 111. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
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tion between negligent joint tortfeasors.48 This same judiciary has
found that the right to contribution or indemnity is no more likely to
incite comparative negligence than any other tort action.4 9  Two re-
cent decisions indicate that Illinois courts may not be unaware of the
propriety of restricting the no-contribution rule to intentional tort-
feasors5 0 To avoid further confusion of both bench and bar, the prob-
lem should be rethought, even if rethinking leads to a clearly expressed
judicial approval of contribution.
Such a task should not be left to an Illinois legislature whose ac-
tivities must be directed by necessity to larger issues of the day.51 The
Illinois Civil Practice Act itself intimates that the legislature wished to
leave this area largely in the hands of the judiciary. Rule 25 of the Act
provides that third-party proceedings shall not create any substantive
right to contribution among tortfeasors which did not exist before the
Act. Clearly this leaves the judiciary free to re-examine and re-evaluate
its own decisions and precedents. Moreover, legislative history indi-
cates that on those infrequent occasions when the legislature has re-
ceived relevant bills, those bills have not been considered52 This lack
of action is not the type of legislative defeat, as after full debate and
vote, which should preclude the judiciary from examining the matter
anew. Moreover, a healthy common law should not normally await
legislative action to extricate the courts from an impasse which the
courts have created and from which the courts are capable of extricating
themselves.
A flexible framework for the Illinois courts would be provided by
abandoning the "active-passive" terminology and using the renamed
primary-technical test for indemnity actions where a prior legal relation-
ship exists between the tortfeasors. Since indemnity actions presuppose
basic absence of personal fault in the indemnitee, the phrase "passive
48. Millsap v. Central Wisconsin Transport Co., 41 111. App. 2d 1, 189 N.E.2d
793 (1963).
49. Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322
(1964). In fact, it seems the active-passive theory, by its process of comparing negli-
gence between defendants to find the "active" one, is more akin to comparative negli-
gence than contribution.
50. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Leveque, 30 I11. App. 2d 120, 173 N.E.2d
737 (1961), where the importance of intentional and conscious wrongdoing was reiter-
ated. Even more significant is Wright v. Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d
340 (1963), where the history of the rule and its limitation to intentionally concerted
actions is set out.
51. The 76th Illinois General Assembly passed 2,207 pieces of legislation. Undated
1970 Bulletin from Illinois State Bar Association to its members.
52. S.B. 809, 76th Illinois General Assembly, introduced by Sen. Arrington, has
remained in the Judiciary Committee. H. B. 1005 and 1006, 76th Illinois General As-
sembly, introduced by Rep. Copeland, were tabled. Letter from Legislative Reference
Bureau to author, Jan. 9, 1970.
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negligence" connotes an unacceptable implication of personal fault or
negligence in fact, when what really occurs is the attribution of a fic-
tional legal negligence to one tortfeasor for various policy reasons. It is
reasonable that a tortfeasor who wishes to shift liability should bear the
greater burden of showing that he is free of personal fault, whether that
fault consists of an intentional tort or of negligence in fact. Contribu-
tion, on the other hand, would require only a showing of freedom
from intent and not of freedom from personal fault or negligence in
fact, since only a sharing of the common liability is being sought. Con-
tribution could also be theoretically used in any indemnity case inas-
much as the broader remedy of indemnity logically includes the nar-
rower remedy of contribution. By pleading in the alternative a party
can be assured that he will at least have some remedy in the event a
questionable indemnity theory fails.
Modern jurists are becoming increasingly aware that negligence is
the accepted price of a complex society, and that in such a society negli-
gence no longer carries the same moral and legal reproach it once
did.5 3  Having recognized negligence in fact as commonplace in a
dynamic society, the legal profession is becoming cognizant of the
anachronistic nature of the no-contribution rule. The courts have
reached a point where they no longer need let shadow rule substance
as they punitively ferret out "bad men" in their vigilance to deny con-
tribution between negligent joint tortfeasors. The opportunity now
exists to mend the seamless web of the law by restoring harmony be-
tween actions for indemnity and contribution.
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53. In 1968, there were 351,065 reported motor vehicle accidents in Illinois which
involved 614,427 drivers. Letter from National Safety Council to the author, Nov. 12,
1969. Clearly a large potential segment of automobile litigation involves multiple de-
fendants without prior relationship.
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